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A- The Price is Wrong
Mary Ann Bates, Rachel Glennerster, Kamilla Gumede, Esther Dulo
(J-PAL)
Abstract. Charging small fees dramatically reduces access to important products for the poor. Relative to 
free distribution, charging even very small user fees substantially reduces adoption. There is no evidence that 
the act of paying for a product makes a recipient more likely to use it. In general, cost-sharing does not appear 
to concentrate adoption on those who need products most. Receiving a product for free can even increase 
willingness to pay for it later. There may be other reasons to charge.
1 Charging small fees dramatically reduces  
 access to important products for the poor.
Medical research has identiied many cheap and simple life-
saving and life-improving interventions that combat infectious 
and communicable disease, but even low-cost interventions 
are often prohibitively expensive for poor families in the de-
veloping world. Where families are unable to afford the full 
cost, governments and NGOs often provide health products 
either for free, or at highly subsidized prices under “user fee” 
or cost-sharing programs. In recent years, there has been sub-
stantial debate about whether to charge user fees or to distrib-
ute basic products for free.
User fees and cost-sharing have been advocated for many 
years to promote sustainability of health services, to help en-
sure that goods and services are not wasted, and to provide a 
source of lexible revenue to those in frontline services to 
 replenish supplies and pay for clinic repairs. More recently, 
social entrepreneurs have argued that small fees can help fund 
marketing networks that bring socially important products to 
the poor in a sustainable way and that people are more likely 
to use products they pay for. Those arguing against charging 
for basic services point to the massive increases in the take-up 
of public services that have accompanied the abolition of user 
fees for schooling and healthcare in many countries. 
What does the evidence say? How big a barrier to access 
are user fees in education and health? Does charging for 
health and education products encourage people to use them? 
Do fees screen out those who do not intend to use the product 
and target it to those who need it the most? Or does charging 
simply screen out the poor? Ten randomized evaluations test-
ed how take-up and use of education and health products for 
non-acute care respond to price. Evidence from these studies 
suggests the following: 
2 Evaluations
This bulletin reviews ten evaluations from four countries 
that inform the often rancorous policy debate about 
whether to charge user fees or distribute basic products 
and services for free. Each of the studies is a rigorous impact 
evaluation, designed to test how changes in price affect the 
way health and education products are accepted and used 
among poor households. In these studies, individuals were 
randomly assigned either to receive a product for free or to 
pay one of several price levels for a product like a long- 
lasting insecticidal bednet or water disinfectant. The studies 
then measured how individuals responded to the different 
price levels through their purchasing decisions and whether 
they decided to use the product in their homes. 
Together, these ten studies provide relevant, rigorous evi-
dence on how free distribution and cost sharing can affect 
how many people get a product, who gets a product, and how 
that product is ultimately used.
Table 1 summarizes these evaluations, numbered 1 through 
10 in the text and igures in this bulletin. Kremer and Miguel(1) 
studied a program by International Child Support Africa 
(ICS) that offered deworming medicine, free or for a small 
fee, in Kenyan schools. Cohen and Dupas(2) evaluated giving 
long-lasting insecticidal bednets at random prices to pregnant 
women in prenatal public health clinics in rural Kenya. In a 
separate Kenyan study, but this time with the general popula-
tion, Dupas(3) randomly assigned households to receive a 
voucher for a free or discounted (at different prices) long-
lasting insecticidal bednet, which they could redeem within 
three months. In a follow-up study, Dupas(4) examined the 
long-term impact of free distribution by going back to those 
households that had been offered vouchers for free or dis-
counted bednets to see which households would be willing to 
purchase a subsidized bednet one year later. In two western 
Ugandan villages, Hoffmann, Barrett, and Just(5) gave partici-
pants either free long-lasting insecticidal bednets or enough 
money to buy them. Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro(6) analyzed a 
program by the Society for Family Health that sold water dis-
infectant at varying prices door-to-door in semi-urban 
Zambia. Another water disinfectant project in Kenya was 
studied by Kremer, Miguel, Mullainathan, Null, and Zwane(7) 
Spears(8) sold discounted handwashing soap (which can help 
M. A. Bates et al.: The Price is Wrong
31www.factsreports.org
prevent diarrhea) in rural Gujarat, India. Two studies looked 
at pricing and education. A program by ICS in Kenya, evalu-
ated by Evans, Kremer, and Ngatia,(9) distributed free school 
uniforms to primary school children. Dulo, Dupas, Kremer, 
and Sinei(10) evaluated a program providing free school uni-
forms to 14-year-old children.
3 Results
3.1 Result 1:  
Small fees cause big reductions in take-up
A common policy response to the competing aims of cost-
sharing and free distribution is to make products almost, 
but not quite, free. But charging even very small prices 
sharply limits the poor’s access to investments in education 
and health, without generating much revenue. Multiple eval-
uations tested how the take-up of a product changes with 
price. In the six studies highlighted in Figure 1, a wide variety 
of price and subsidy levels were tested.
Together, these studies offer a consistent result: Even 
very small increases in price led to large drops in the 
number of people who chose to buy health products. A 
deworming program in Kenya(1) offered free deworming 
treatment to students in some schools and, in an effort to 
make the program more inancially sustainable, for a small 
price that averaged $0.30 in other schools. The introduction 
of a small fee reduced deworming treatment from 75 percent 
in schools with free distribution to only 19 percent in schools 
with cost-sharing. 
Sales of water disinfectant (dilute chlorine) in Zambia(6) 
show a similar decline. Take-up fell by over 30 percentage 
points when prices increased from $0.09 to $0.25. In Kenya,(7)
chlorine water disinfectant was offered for free and at a small 
price, and household water was tested for chlorine to see 
which households used the product. Compared to free distri-
bution, the percentage of households using chlorine in their 
water fell by 52 percentage points when households had to 
purchase the disinfectant. However, there was little differ-
ence in take-up between offering coupons for half-price 
 chlorine ($0.15) and charging full price ($0.30). In Kenya,(2) 
 bednet sales at prenatal clinics dropped by 60 percentage 
points when the price was increased from zero to $0.60–a 
price still $0.15 below the discounted price that social mar-
keting programs typically charge pregnant women in Kenya.
The drop-off in demand with small prices does not 
 appear to be as inluenced by the market value of the 
product or subsidy rate as might be expected. A bednet 
costs $6, so a price of $0.60 represents a 90 percent subsidy 
rate. The prices charged for water disinfectant in Kenya, by 
contrast, ranged from a 50 percent subsidy to no subsidy at 
all. Yet the drop in demand for bednets is about as steep as 
Table 1. Featured evaluations.
Product Researchers Location Prices tested
Approximate 
market price
1. Deworming medicine Kremer, Miguel Kenya free, $0.30 $0.50-1.50
2. Long-lasting insecticidal bednets (at prenatal clinics) Cohen, Dupas Kenya free, $0.15 to $0.60 $6.00
3. Long-lasting insecticidal bednets  
(vouchers given to households)
Dupas Kenya free up to $4.60 $7.63
4. Long-lasting insecticidal bednets  
(follow-up to study #3)
Dupas Kenya $2.30 $7.63
5. Long-lasting insecticidal bednets  
(received cash or nets)
Hoffman, Barret, 
Just
Uganda free up to $7.63 $7.63
6. Water desinfectants Ashraf, Berry, 
Shapiro
Zambia free,  
$0.09 to $0.25*
$0.25
7. Water desinfectants Kremer, Miguel, 
Null, Zwane
Kenya free,  
$0.15 and $0.30
$0.30
8. Handwashing soap Spcars India $0.06 and $0.30 $0.52
9. School uniforms, primary school children Evans, Kremer, 
Ngatia
Kenya free, $5.82 $5.82
10. School uniforms, 14 years old students Dulo, Dupas, 
Kremer, Sinei
Kenya free, $6.00 $6.00
* These prices include prices initially offered to customers and prices offered after a second round of discounts.
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the drop in demand for water disinfectant (Figure 1), sug-
gesting that demand does not appear to be sensitive to the 
exact subsidy level.
Two evaluations in Kenya tested how take-up chang-
es with price in the context of education. In Kenya, pri-
mary school fees have been eliminated, and a $6 uniform 
presents one of the main remaining costs of attending 
school. In both evaluations, students randomly selected to 
receive a free uniform were more likely to attend school: 
In one evaluation, primary school students had higher 
school attendance (by 6.4 percentage points),(9) and in an-
other, 14-year-old girls were 2.5 percentage points less 
likely to have dropped out.(10) 
At face value, the drop in take-up between free provision 
and cost-sharing appears to be much smaller for education 
than for the health products outlined in Figure 1. However, 
the cost of a uniform represents only a small fraction of the 
cost of schooling, considering that the Kenyan government 
has already invested signiicant funds to operate and staff 
schools. Still, for the sake of a $6 uniform, 2.5 to 6.4 percent 
of children were not attending school.
3.2 Result 2:  
Fees do not substantially promote use
For some products, no effort is required by an individual to 
make the product effective. When a child lines up to be 
 dewormed, the teacher puts a pill in her mouth and watches 
her swallow it. When a child is immunized, the healthcare 
provider administers the injections. For these products, where 
there is no step between take-up and use, there is no potential 
for user fees to increase use.
Other products require repeated, active use by recipients 
to be effective. A bednet is no help in preventing malaria if it 
is still in its package and not hung up. Chlorine does not 
prevent diarrhea if it is not regularly added to a family’s 
drinking water. It is a waste of resources to hand out prod-
ucts for free if they will not be used correctly. 
Many governments and NGOs around the world charge 
user fees in an attempt to prevent resources from being 
Figure 1. Demand for Preventive Healthcare Products Based on Price
DEWORMING, KENYA
BEDNETS IN CLINICS, KENYA
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Spillover effects may justify free distribution
Many investments in health offer beneits that reach be-
yond individual users. If a child sleeps under an insecti-
cide-treated bednet, she helps reduce the prevalence of 
malaria-infected mosquitoes for the whole community. 
If she receives an immunization, she helps prevent the 
spread of infectious disease. When some children are 
treated for parasitic worms, even untreated children in 
the same school and in nearby schools beneit–from low-
er worm load and improved attendance at school–be-
cause deworming helps break the cycle of transmission 
(Miguel and Kremer 2004). In other words, these health 
products have positive spillovers.
In these cases where individual use of a product creates 
positive spillovers, many economists and policymakers 
have agreed that products should be highly subsidized or 
even given away. These subsidies may be needed to reach 
a level of use that is optimal for the whole community 
and to compensate individuals for the beneits they are 
generating for others in the community. Without this, in-
dividuals may be unwilling to pay for the beneits they 
create for others.
Lesson: Goods and services with suficiently high posi-
tive spillovers should be a priority for free distribution.
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wasted, believing that charging encourages use. But does it 
work? The balance of evidence is that it does not. 
Figure 2 summarizes the overall effect of price on use. In 
all of these studies, visits were made to recipients’ houses to 
see if products were in fact being used. For example, survey-
ors tested for the presence of chlorine in recipients’ water in 
Zambia,(6) and visited participants’ homes to observe whether 
the program nets were indeed hung above beds in Kenya (2,4) 
and in Uganda.(5) Because bednets used at night may have 
been taken down during the day when surveyors visited and 
because chlorine residuals in water decline quickly, these 
 igures are lower bounds of usage, and self-reported usage 
is higher. 
In Uganda,(5) researchers found no difference in usage be-
tween those who received free long-lasting insecticidal bed-
nets and those who received cash to buy bednets. In Kenya, 
usage was no different after two months and after one year 
between people who received vouchers for a free bednet and 
those who received vouchers to purchase a subsidized bednet.
Two studies further disentangle the potential effects of 
price on usage. When patients, students, or consumers have 
to take action to get the beneits of a product, charging has 
been thought to promote use in two ways: First, individuals 
who value a product highly may be both more likely to pay 
for a product and more likely to use it once they have it. Thus, 
a user fee may help to prevent waste by screening out those 
who are not likely to use the product (i.e. a screening effect). 
Second, many NGOs and agencies argue that the mere act of 
paying for something encourages people to use it more than 
if they had received the same product for free (i.e. a psycho-
logical commitment effect, or the “sunk cost” effect).
One bednet evaluation(2) and one water disinfectant eva-
luation(6) tried to distinguish these two effects. To test the 
screening effect, researchers randomly selected some indi-
viduals in the study to be offered products at different prices: 
Some were offered a product for free, and some were offered 
the same product at a subsidized price. If a screening effect 
promotes use by selecting out those who are unlikely to use a 
product, one would expect those who chose to pay for the 
Figure 2. 
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Does free distribution  
to the poor lead to reselling? 
A major concern for scaling up free delivery programs is 
that those who do not intend to use a product might nev-
ertheless accept the free gift and then sell it to others, 
undermining the aim of getting the product to poor 
households who would beneit from it. In the studies 
summarized here, the recipients of free bednets were 
 surprisingly unwilling to sell them. 
Hoffmann et al.’s bednet study in Uganda(5) revealed a 
strong, surprising effect. On average, participants were 
willing to spend only $2.34 of their own cash on a long-
lasting insecticidal bednet, but those who received bed-
nets for free were generally unwilling to sell them. 
Among those who received up to three free bednets, 
73 percent were unwilling to sell even one bednet for 
$7.63, which was the product cost of the bednet and the 
maximum resale price allowed in the study. Dupas’s 
study(3) also inds that those who receive bednets for free 
tend to keep them: 12 months after households received 
a free bednet, 95 percent still had the net in their house.
A bigger concern is that health workers tasked with 
giving free health products to a particular target group 
(pregnant women, children, or the poor) might sell the 
products to others. Ongoing research is evaluating the 
extent of this problem and alternative ways to address it.
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product to use it more than those who accepted the product 
for free. 
To test the psychological commitment effect, researchers 
added a second level of price randomization. Among indi-
viduals who chose to buy a product at a certain price (e.g. 
they put cash on the table to buy a bednet), a randomly se-
lected subset was then offered the product at an additional 
discount or for free. If a psychological commitment effect 
causes people to rationalize their purchases by using the 
product, one would expect those who purchased the product 
at the original price to use it more than those who received 
the additional discount. 
These two studies offer little evidence that user fees pro-
mote use through either the screening effect or the psycho-
logical commitment effect. In Kenya,(2) there was neither a 
screening effect nor a psychological effect of paying for 
bednets. Those who received a net for free were just as like-
ly to use it as those who paid for it. 
In Zambia,(6) researchers did not observe a psychological 
commitment effect of paying for water disinfectant: Those 
who were willing to pay, but were then selected to receive 
chlorine for free, were just as likely to use it as those who 
paid. The screening effect, however, did exist: A 10 percent 
increase in the price of the disinfectant led to a 3 to 4 percent 
increase in the probability that the eventual owners of the dis-
infectant would be found using it. Charging did screen out 
some people who were always unlikely to use the product, 
although it also screened out some who would have used it, 
had the chlorine been free. 
The importance of this screening effect depends heavily 
on what happens to the bottles of chlorine that people accept 
or buy, but do not ultimately use in their drinking water. If 
people accept chlorine bottles, intending to use them in their 
drinking water, but do not immediately use these bottles, 
they are unlikely to continue accepting more and more bot-
tles in subsequent rounds of free or subsidized distribution. 
Thus the screening effect of charging would be less useful in 
reducing waste in the long-term. If people are accepting the 
chlorine to use it for less socially important purposes (such 
as cleaning), the screening effect of pricing may be more 
useful for achieving the more socially important health 
 beneits. This raises an important general point: Whether re-
cipients tend to use health products for other (less socially 
important) purposes should be a factor in deciding whether 
to prioritize a product for free distribution.
3.3 Result 3: 
Cost-sharing fails to target those  
who most need a product
Some people stand to beneit more from health products 
than others. If they are aware of this fact and thus are more 
willing to pay for these products, charging may be a conve-
nient way to target subsidized products to the most needy. In 
contrast, if those who need a product most are also poorer 
and less able to afford fees, charging may actually lead to 
worse targeting. 
Fees failed to target the sickest or the most vulnerable. 
In Kenya,(1) children with high parasitic worm loads would 
have beneited most from deworming treatment, but their 
families were no more likely to pay for treatment than the 
families of children with low worm loads. Malaria in preg-
nant women can result in anemia, potentially leading to nega-
tive impacts on a woman’s health and the health of her child. 
However, in Kenya(2) pregnant women who were willing to 
pay higher prices for bednets appeared no sicker (in terms of 
measured anemia) than the average prenatal client when they 
made their purchase. Families with young children have a 
higher need for bednets to protect against malaria, but in 
Uganda,(5) households with more young children actually had 
a lower willingness to pay for bednets. 
Charging small fees in an attempt to balance 
access and “sustainability” may be the worst 
of both worlds, as small fees raise little 
 revenue, but dramatically reduce access  
to important products for the poor
• Relative to free distribution, charging even very 
small user fees substantially reduces adoption. 
When a program in Kenya moved from free de-
worming to charging an average of 30 cents per 
child, take up fell from 75 to 19 percent. Similar 
declines were seen when charging for water disin-
fectant and long-lasting insecticidal bednets.
• There is no evidence that the act of paying for a 
product makes a recipient more likely to use it. A 
common claim is that people are more likely to 
use what they have sacriiced for, but two studies 
designed to test this found no effect.
• In general, cost-sharing does not appear to con-
centrate adoption on those who need products 
most. Families with children under ive are not 
more likely to buy water disinfectant; pregnant 
women who buy long-lasting insecticidal bednets 
appear no sicker than average; and parents of chil-
dren with high parasitic worm loads are no more 
likely to purchase deworming pills.
• Receiving a product for free can even increase 
willingness to pay for it later. While some argue 
that giving something away makes people less 
likely to pay for the product in the future, those 
given a free long-lasting insecticidal bednet in 
Kenya were more likely to buy one later, as were 
their neighbors, presumably because they learned 
about the beneits of the product. 
• There may be other reasons to charge. User fees 
may incentivize service providers to stock supplies 
and come to work, and the importance of these po-
tential effects needs rigorous evaluation. Even if 
user fees serve these purposes, there may be better 
ways to incentivize service providers than user 
fees, which restrict access for the poor. 
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Young children are particularly vulnerable to the negative 
effects of diarrhea, but families with more young children in 
Zambia(6) were not willing to pay higher prices for chlorine 
than other families. Similarly in Kenya,(7) families with young 
children were no more likely to buy subsidized chlorine for 
their drinking water than families without small children.
Taken together, these ive studies indicate that charging 
fees is not generally a reliable way to help target health prod-
ucts to those who need them most.
3.4 Result 4:  
Long-term effects of free distribution
Many NGOs and governments worry that if products are 
distributed for free, people will resent having to pay for 
them in the future. They fear that if funding for free distri-
bution runs out, take-up will plummet below what it was 
before free distribution. Dupas’s study in Kenya(4) was de-
signed to answer this question: Will those who receive a 
free long-lasting insecticidal bednet be more or less willing 
to pay for a bednet one year later?
Dupas found that learning about the beneits of a product 
through free distribution may actually make people more 
willing to pay for a product in the future. In this follow-up 
study, Dupas returned to households one year after they had 
been offered free or subsidized bednets and offered them the 
chance to purchase another net for $2.30. Those who had 
been offered free nets previously were 41 percent more likely 
to buy a net than those who had been offered nets at a subsi-
dized price, even though the former group was more likely to 
already own a net. 
The neighbors of those offered free nets were also more 
likely to buy a net than the neighbors of those who had to pay 
for a net. The reason? Free distribution meant people had 
more neighbors with nets, so it is possible that they had great-
er exposure to the beneits of the nets and thus were more 
likely to purchase one. 
In this case, people did not get used to receiving some-
thing for free; they got used to the beneits of bednets. While 
fewer studies have examined the long-term effects of free 
distribution, these results suggest that individuals may not 
resent having to pay after having received a product for free 
in the past.
3.5 Result 5:  
Why are people so sensitive to small user fees? 
Individuals in these studies were extremely sensitive to small 
user fees. A standard economics view would suggest that if 
someone is not prepared to pay much for something then it 
cannot be of much use to them. But a number of pieces of evi-
dence suggest that this is too simpliied a story. For example, 
as discussed previously, people were both reluctant to pay 
much for a bednet and yet were unwilling to sell it for a much 
higher price. Why are individuals so reluctant to invest even 
small amounts in preventive health products? 
People may simply not have the cash on hand to pur-
chase a product. In Hoffmann et al.’s study,(5) individuals 
using their own cash were willing to pay on average $2.34 for 
a bednet. When the researchers provided people with enough 
cash to buy a net, the individuals were willing to pay more 
than twice that amount ($5.94). 
In an evaluation by Dupas in Kenya,(3) demand for bednets 
fell less steeply with price when households were given more 
time to raise the funds to purchase them (Figure 3). Unlike 
the previous Cohen and Dupas study,(2) in which pregnant 
women needed to purchase a bednet on the spot, in this evalu-
ation households were given three months to redeem vouch-
ers for discounted bednets in local stores. When individuals 
had time to come up with the money to purchase a bednet 
with a voucher, far more chose to purchase a net at a given 
price. The time people took to redeem the voucher also in-
creased with the price of the net: Those who received a 
voucher for a free bednet redeemed it within a few days, 
while those who received a voucher for a subsidized bednet 
took one to two months to redeem the voucher. 
In a randomized evaluation in rural Orissa, India, some mi-
croinance clients were offered insecticide-treated bednets 
for free, while others could buy them at full price with the 
option of a one-year credit contract at 20 percent interest. 
After having two days to think about the offer, 52 percent of 
households purchased at least one bednet on credit. In the 
free group, 96 percent of households received a bednet 
(Tarozzi et al. 2011). While the microinance clients in this 
study represent a different population than that of the other 
bednet evaluations in this bulletin, demand fell much less 
steeply with price when credit was available for the bednet. 
User fee revenue comes at a cost 
User fees have long been advocated as a way to help re-
cover costs and make programs more inancially sustain-
able. However, if charging small amounts signiicantly 
reduces take-up, the cost of administrating the program 
will be amortized over far fewer users, increasing the 
 administrative costs per person. For example, in the de-
worming program in Kenya,(1) fewer families chose to 
deworm their children under cost-sharing, resulting in 
much higher administrative costs per child. Overall, the 
researchers ind that the cost per child dewormed under 
cost-sharing was more than twice as high as under free 
distribution ($4.26 vs. $1.48), and far fewer children re-
ceived the treatment.
Charging may generate some revenue to help cover 
program costs, but it is important to realize that the rev-
enue generated under cost-sharing comes at a cost to the 
poor. In other words, collecting money through user fees 
will not necessarily increase the cost-effectiveness of a 
program when one considers the costs and beneits from 
a societal perspective, rather than from the perspective of 
the organization implementing the program. In their 
study of bednets in Kenya, Cohen and Dupas(2) ind cost-
sharing to be at best marginally more cost-effective than 
free distribution, but suggest that free distribution could 
save many more lives. 
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This suggests that a lack of cash on hand explains at least part 
of the drop in demand seen with user fees, although it is also 
possible that people put less emphasis on costs in the future 
(in this case, loan repayments). 
4 Convenience also matters
Just as people are sensitive to small prices, they are also 
 sensitive to distance. Some additional evaluations ind that 
convenience matters more than would be predicted by stan-
dard economic models, which suggests that behavioral as-
pects inluence take-up as well. Evaluations available at 
www.povertyactionlab.org found that take-up dropped with 
distance for services ranging from immunizations to HIV 
test results, and for products ranging from iron-fortiied lour 
to clean water. 
This reinforces the concern that people underinvest (both 
in time and money) in preventive healthcare. Behavioral 
economics has focused attention on one potential explana-
tion, present bias, where immediate concerns trump long-
term factors.
5 Does deliberation deter purchases?
One study in rural India(8) tested the idea that the effort in-
volved in thinking about a purchasing decision may deter 
people. If a product or service is free, however, the calcula-
tion becomes much simpler–there are no costs, only beneits–
and people may be more likely to take the good. Individuals 
randomly assigned to the treatment group were asked ques-
tions designed to require thinking about the value of money. 
Relative to a comparison group asked unrelated questions, 
the treatment group was slightly more likely to purchase soap 
at higher prices. However, the magnitude of the effect was 
small, and at best it explains a small part of why people are so 
price sensitive to small costs. It is also possible that delibera-
tion costs are a factor only when people face time pressure to 
make a decision on the spot. 
The very low take-up of preventive health products pres-
ents a puzzle. A lack of cash on hand can explain part of the 
puzzle, and inconveniences like travel distance also play a 
role. Although there may still be debate about why we see 
this behavior, there is strong evidence that very small increas-
es in price deter many. 
6 Policy Lessons
Charging small fees in an attempt to balance access and 
“sustainability” may be the worst of both worlds, as small 
fees raise little revenue, but dramatically reduce access to 
important products for the poor. 
Amid calls to improve the effectiveness of poverty pro-
grams, are user fees the answer? Does cost-sharing promote 
sustainability? Does it improve targeting? Will people use 
what is free? Does charging simply screen out the poor? 
Who, in a household, gets what is paid for?
Ten experiments which randomly varied prices for impor-
tant health and education products offer some answers to 
these questions. Together they suggest that charging even 
very small user fees often sharply limits access to health and 
education products and services without promoting use or en-
couraging better targeting to any useful extent. Some results 
suggest that free distribution does not necessarily undermine 
the willingness of users to buy the product in the future. 
Indeed, free distribution can help people understand the ben-
eits of a product and make them more willing to pay for it 
in the future. Additional results imply that households who 
receive a product for free are reluctant to resell it. 
However, governments and agencies cannot provide every-
thing for free. What guidance do these ten experiments offer 
the debate on cost-sharing? When are the disadvantages of 
cost-sharing likely to be so great that products should be 
 offered for free? 
6.1 When to distribute for free
•	 When	 beneits	 extend	 beyond	 the	 immediate	 user. 
Many investments in education and health have addi-
tional beneits to the community associated with 
widespread individual use. For example, individual 
immunizations, deworming treatment, or bednet use 
can reduce disease transmission in a community. In 
cases where these beneits to the community are large, 
distributing these products for free can lead to a larger 
social beneit than charging. Therefore, products 
which reduce the prevalence or transmission of dis-
eases, which might inspire neighbors to adopt benei-
cial new technology, which boost the productivity of 
others, or which otherwise have beneits beyond its 
users are good candidates for free distribution.
•	 When	 products	 and	 services	 are	 aimed	 mainly	 at	
	preventive	behavior.	Many cost-effective preventive 
Figure 3. Price Sensitivity Falls when People Have More 
Time to Buy.
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health products are available across the world, but in-
dividuals are not choosing to purchase them. Pricing 
policies that help people make up-front investments in 
prevention, or help them persist in long-term health 
investments, may have especially large payoffs. 
•	 When	 the	 product	 is	 very	 cost-effective. Some 
health products are very cheap relative to their ben-
eits. In this case, even if some of the product is not 
used for its intended purpose or goes to people who 
do not use it, mass free distribution can still be high-
ly cost-effective. 
In situations where children beneit but parents have to pay 
user fees, there may similarly be a risk of underinvestment if 
parents do not fully take into account the beneits to the child. 
And inally, to the extent that liquidity constraints (i.e. simple 
lack of ready cash) explain underinvestment, free distribution 
is particularly important for those with the most acute liquid-
ity constraints, often the poor and women. 
Many dificult logistical issues remain for implementing 
systems of free distribution of cost-effective products for the 
poor. In many cases where governments have announced free 
primary education or free healthcare for pregnant women and 
children, unoficial fees remain the norm. How can these un-
oficial fees be eliminated most effectively? How can health 
workers be prevented from selling products that should go to 
the poor for free? If fees are effectively eliminated and no 
longer supplement the incomes of service providers, will 
their absenteeism increase? Are clinics that provide products 
for free more subject to stockouts, and if so, how can stock-
outs be reduced? Additionally, broader questions remain on 
the impact of user fees for other types of health services. We 
know much less about the effect of user fees on take-up of 
treatment for acute illness, for example. 
These are all important questions that need to be answered 
though rigorous evaluation. But the evidence summarized in 
this bulletin suggests that user fees, even small ones, 
are imposing a very high price on the poor and dramatically 
curtailing the potential beneits from primary education and 
highly effective preventive health products.
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What we don’t know about charging
There may be other reasons to charge user fees. For 
 example, as supplements to salaries, user fees could 
 provide incentives for service providers to keep pro-
ducts in stock, to replenish supplies, and to come to 
work. These effects have yet to be tested by random-
ized evaluations. 
Further studies could also explore alternative ways of 
incentivizing service providers and keeping products 
in stock, while avoiding the large drop in take-up 
caused by user fees. J-PAL’s bulletin on service pro-
vider attendance, “Showing Up is the First Step,” illus-
trates how complex incentivizing service providers can 
be and offers some positive examples of programs that 
have been effective at reducing absenteeism among 
teachers, doctors, and nurses, without relying on user 
fees or cost-sharing.
